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F a c u l t y

V I E W S
responsible compliance that evidently were not present on the
Deepwater Horizon.
The BP operation was 40 miles offshore, in water 5,000 feet deep,
and yet it was far from being the most extreme of today’s drilling
locations. Plenty of wells are operating and in development deeper
and farther offshore. The current record holder is in 10,000 feet of
water, nearly twice the depth of BP’s well.

Peak Oil, Risky Oil, and Energy Strategy

Why are we pursuing resources in such difficult places? Partly
because technology makes it possible; and partly because oil
prices and supply constraints, current and anticipated, make it
worth going after these resources.

By Edward R. Parson
I’m going to begin this discussion of the Gulf oil spill by backing up
and placing this catastrophe in the context of larger-scale problems
with current energy policy, in the United States and globally.

The U.S. and world economies depend on fossil fuels for more
than 80 percent of their total energy supplies, and for almost 100
percent of their transportation fuels. Yet even as world demand
grows, particularly in the economies of Asia, production of easily
extractable oil from easily reached places is in decline.
Consequently, market conditions are forcing production toward
increasingly remote, sensitive, and dangerous places, continually
pushing the limits of advancing technology.

As shocking as the situation in the Gulf of Mexico may be, in this
broader context it must be regarded as a normal event. That’s not
to say that it’s normal in relation to past experience. Rather, the
Gulf spill is “the new normal,” in the sense that our current energy
strategy—or lack thereof—will make such events increasingly
likely, even if we assume conditions of effective regulation and

Absent a concerted move in a different direction, these trends will
continue, bringing ever smaller extensions to the lifespan of these
finite resources, at the price of increasing risk and environmental
harm. On this trajectory, events like the Gulf spill may well become
commonplace.
This is a global energy crisis—but we appear not to be noticing,
largely because it is so unlike the energy crises of the 1970s.
Those came on fast, triggered by individual acts and political
events such as the OPEC embargo of 1973 and the Iranian supply
disruption in the 1979 revolution.
This one, by contrast, is slow and structural, driven by the gradual
but inexorable divergence between growing global demand and
increasingly scarce and difficult supply, and it will have no simple
or quick resolution. It cannot be reversed by any single act, such as
persuading OPEC to lift its embargo, or by increasing U.S. domestic
production, since there simply isn’t enough available.
Rather, the only possible response is to reduce dependence on
scarce energy sources through large-scale shifts in both demand
(using less energy through efficiency improvements and other
adjustments) and supply (developing new resources). This will
mean higher—but not necessarily unreasonable—energy prices.
Given a strong program of research, technology development, and
investment, there are plenty of opportunities to achieve the
required new energy supplies and demand reductions.
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But there are perils on this path. We face not just one slow-moving
energy crisis but two: the crisis of energy supply security as
conventional oil and gas sources decline, and the crisis of climate
change from the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions that are tightly
linked to fossil-fuel use. These two crises are related, but they are
not the same, and we must solve them both. Unfortunately, some
widely supported solutions to the problem of energy supply
security would not only fail to solve the problem of climate change
but would make it much worse.

Whether we successfully navigate both crises will depend on
where we turn for new energy sources as cheap oil declines. The
simplest path would be to continue obtaining liquid fuels from
fossil resources, chasing oil in ever more remote locations, and
shifting to unconventional resources such as oil sands and liquids
processed from coal or shale, which require intensive upstream
processing.

To his credit, President Obama has used the crisis to promote
comprehensive energy and climate legislation. But the current
congressional bills and administration proposals, although better
than nothing, are too weak to drive the required reorientation of
investment and research throughout the energy sector. Also, the
president’s June address to the nation was distressingly
ambivalent as to the policies needed to end our dependence on
fossil fuels.

Law Quadrangle • Fall 2010

From the viewpoint of present energy industries and regulatory
approaches, this is the familiar path, with incremental development While the spill may provide an opportunity to change the direcof existing technologies. There are plenty of these resources to tion of America’s dangerously unsustainable energy strategy, the
meet world demand for decades, and the
opportunity to craft a more sustainable
approach has strong proponents. But this path
strategy poses many challenges and risks. It
would make climate change much worse, not
is hard to get the policies right, providing
only because it would continue using carbonstrong enough long-term incentives to move
Our current
based fuels to meet growing demand, but
investment and R&D toward a radically difenergy
because the required upstream processing
ferent energy future while limiting shortsharply increases the CO2 emitted in
term disruptions. It is perhaps even harder
strategy—or
delivering each unit of energy, nearly doubling
to get the politics right, because, with
that number for some sources.
the possible exception of reducing federal
lack thereof—
entitlement programs, there is nothing in
Attempting to extend the energy supply in this
American politics more dangerous than
will
make
way would commit us to a high-CO2 pathway
raising the price of gasoline (just ask anyone
for much of the century, or a wrenching and
such
events
involved in attempts to increase federal
costly adjustment if we later realize our error
fuel taxes during the Carter or Clinton
and change course after major investments
increasingly
administrations).
are made.
likely.
Energy prices can only increase as the end
Ultimately, the route to a climate-safe future
of the cheap-oil era approaches; and they
is not compatible with large-scale movement
must increase a little more to move us to the
toward liquids from coal, oil sands, or other
energy path that limits climate change.
heavy hydrocarbons as replacements for
Explaining this fact persuasively is among
declining cheap oil. Avoiding dangerous
the jobs of the president and congressional leaders. Unfortunately,
climate change requires that, as cheap oil declines, we shift
there are many ways for them to get it wrong.
instead to new energy sources that do not emit greenhouse gases:
renewables such as solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear power. This They could, for example, draft legislation that gives away too
option does not require the sudden stoppage of fossil fuel use. much to current fossil interests (e.g., by over-reliance on “clean
There can be an extended transition period, provided new fossil coal”) or to other claimants (e.g., by building complex credit and
investments include technologies to separate the carbon and store offset systems that reward short-term trading and weaken
incentives for long-term investments). Or they could subscribe to
it underground, rather than emitting it into the atmosphere.
magical thinking about the ability of technology to solve the
Taking this path would require sensible market incentives to develclimate and energy problems, without policy incentives.
op and invest in climate-safe sources by making greenhouse gas
emissions costly, such as emission taxes or cap-and-trade systems. Perhaps most dangerous, reaction to the spill could trigger shortWith such policies steering investors toward low- and non-emitting term energy price spikes. This could be caused by several factors,
technologies, the most dangerous routes to meeting energy de- including the direct regulatory response to the spill, proposed
new climate and energy policies, world market conditions, and
mand as cheap oil declines would be priced out of the market.
strategic behavior by firms. (If you doubt the last possibility,
If we develop these incentives sensibly—and implement them
recall Enron’s role in the California electricity crisis of 2000.) Such
gradually—it’s likely that we can still limit climate change at a
a price spike, in turn, could lead to a backlash against long-term
modest cost. Most analyses suggest the price of avoiding the
climate and energy policies and a panic to develop new fossil
worst (but not all) risks of climate change to be about one percent
resources.
of future GDP. The problem is, we’ve been waiting on the starting
line for more than 20 years, and the time for such a low-pain fix is This is a real risk. If such a scenario unfolds, the resultant weakrunning out. The longer we wait, the harder it will be.
ening or blockage of urgently needed climate and energy policies
would be an even more damaging consequence of the spill than
The BP oil spill is not merely a symptom of the destructive direction
its direct harm to the Gulf region.
current energy policy is heading. It is an attention-grabbing event
that will influence the broader politics of energy, for good or ill.
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